1
What Is Inflation
Targeting?
Inflation
targeting is a monetary policy strategy that encompasses five main
elements: 1)
the
public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation; 2)
an
institutional
commitment
to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which
other goals
are
subordinated;
3) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not
just
monetary
aggregates
or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy
instruments;
4)
increased
transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with
the
public and
the
markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary
authorities;
and 5) increased.2
accountability
of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. The list
should
clarify one
crucial
point about inflation targeting: it entails much more than a
public
announcement of
numerical
targets for inflation for the year ahead. This is important in the
context of
emerging
markets’
countries because many of them routinely reported numerical inflation
targets
or
objectives
as part of the government's economic plan for the coming year, and yet
their
monetary
policy
strategy should not be characterized as inflation targeting, which
requires the
other four
elements
for it to be sustainable over the medium term.
Advantages of Inflation
Targeting
Inflation
targeting has several advantages as a medium-term strategy for monetary
policy.
In contrast to an exchange rate peg, inflation targeting enables
monetary
policy to focus
on
domestic considerations and to respond to shocks to the domestic
economy. In
contrast to
monetary
targeting, another possible monetary policy strategy, inflation
targeting has
the
advantage
that a stable relationship between money and inflation is not critical
to its
success:
the
strategy does not depend on such a relationship, but instead uses all
available
information
to
determine the best settings for the instruments of monetary policy.
Inflation
targeting also
has the
key advantage that it is easily understood by the public and is thus
highly
transparent.
Because
an explicit numerical target for inflation increases the accountability
of the
central
bank, inflation targeting also has the potential to reduce the
likelihood that
the central
bank will
fall into the time-inconsistency trap. Moreover, since the source of
time-inconsistency
is often
found in (covert or open) political pressures on the central bank to
undertake
overly expansionary monetary policy, inflation targeting has the
advantage of.3
focusing
the political debate on what a central bank can do in the long-run --
i.e.,
control
inflation
-- rather than what it cannot do -- raise output growth, lower
unemployment,
increase
external
competitiveness-- through monetary policy. For inflation targeting to
deliver
these
outcomes,
there must exist a strong institutional commitment to make price
stability the
primary
goal of
the central bank. This is particularly important in emerging market
countries
which
have
often had a past history of monetary mismanagement. The institutional
commitment
involves
legislative support for an independent central bank whose charter ought
to
contain two
key
features: 1) sufficient insulation of the policymaking board of the
central
bank from the
politicians--with
members of the government excluded and the members of the board
appointed
to long
terms and protected from arbitrary dismissal; and 2) giving the central
bank
full and
exclusive
control over the setting of monetary policy instruments. The
institutional commitment
to price
stability also requires that the central bank be given a mandate to
have price
stability
as its
primary goal, making it clear that when there is a conflict with other
goals,
such as
exchange
rate stability or promotion of high employment, price stability must be
accorded the
higher
priority.
Inflation-targeting
regimes also put great stress on the need to make monetary policy
transparent
and to maintain regular channels of communication with the public; in
fact,
these
features
have been central to the strategy's success in industrialized
countries. As
illustrated in
Frederic
Mishkin and Adam Posen (1997), and in Ben Bernanke, Thomas Laubach,
Frederic
Mishkin
and Adam Posen (1999), inflation-targeting central banks have frequent
communications
with the government, and their officials take every opportunity to make
public
speeches
on their monetary policy strategy. Inflation targeting central banks
have taken
public
outreach
a step further: they publish Inflation Report-type documents
(originated
by the Bank.4
of England)
to
clearly present their views about the past and future performance
of
inflation and
monetary
policy.
Another
key feature of inflation-targeting regimes is that the transparency of
policy
associated
with inflation targeting has tended to make the central bank highly
accountable
to
the
public. Sustained success in the conduct of monetary policy as measured
against
a pre-announced
and
well-defined inflation target can be instrumental in building public
support
for
an
independent central bank, even in the absence of a rigidly defined and
legalistic standard of
performance
evaluation and punishment.
Disadvantages of Inflation
Targeting
Critics of
inflation targeting have noted seven major disadvantages of this
monetary
policy strategy.
Four of those disadvantages -- that inflation targeting is too rigid,
that it
allows
too much
discretion, that it has the potential to increase output instability,
and that
it will lower
economic
growth-- have been discussed in Mishkin (1999) and in Bernanke, et al.
(1999),
and
are in
reality not serious objections to a properly designed inflation
targeting
strategy which is
best
characterized as “constrained discretion”. The fifth disadvantage, that
inflation targeting
can only
produce weak central bank accountability because inflation is hard to
control
and
because
there are long lags from the monetary policy instruments to the
inflation
outcome, is
an
especially serious one for emerging market countries. The sixth and
seventh
disadvantages,
that inflation
targeting cannot prevent fiscal dominance, and that the exchange rate
flexibility
required by
inflation targeting might cause financial instability, are also very
relevant
in the
emerging
market country context..5
In
contrast to exchange rates and monetary aggregates, the inflation rate
cannot
be easily controlled by the central bank; furthermore, inflation
outcomes that
incorporate the effects of changes in instruments settings are revealed
only
after a substantial lag. The difficulty of controlling inflation
creates a
particularly severe problem for emerging market countries when
inflation is
being brought down from relatively high levels. In those circumstances,
inflation forecast errors are likely to be large, inflation targets
will tend
to be missed, and it will be difficult for the central bank to gain
credibility
from an inflation targeting strategy, and for the public to ascertain
the
reasons for the deviations. This suggests that, as noted by Paul
Masson, Miguel
Savastano and Sunil Sharma (1997), inflation targeting is likely to be
a more
effective strategy if it is phased in only after there has been some
successful
disinflation.
One other
factor affecting inflation controllability that is especially relevant
in the
emerging market context is the (at times large) incidence of
government-controlled prices on the index used to compute headline
inflation.
As a result inflation targeting may demand a high degree of
coordination
between monetary and fiscal authorities on the timing and magnitude of
future
changes in controlled prices or, alternatively, the exclusion of
controlled
prices from the targeted price index, as in the Czech Republic.
A sixth
shortcoming of inflation targeting is that it may not be sufficient to
ensure
fiscal
discipline
or prevent fiscal dominance. Governments can still pursue irresponsible
fiscal
policy
with an
inflation targeting regime in place. In the long run, large fiscal
deficits
will cause an
inflation
targeting regime to break down: the fiscal deficits will eventually
have to be
monetized
or the public debt eroded by a large devaluation, and high inflation
will
follow.
Absence
of outright fiscal dominance is therefore a key prerequisite for
inflation
targeting, and
the
setting up of institutions that help keep fiscal policy in check are
crucial to
the success of.6
the
strategy (Masson et al., 1997) Similarly, a sound financial system is
another
prerequisite
for
successful inflation targeting because when financial systems blow up,
there is
typically a
surge in
inflation in emerging market countries. However, as pointed out in
Frederic
Mishkin
and
Miguel Savastano (1999), a sound financial system and the absence of
fiscal
dominance
are also
crucial to the sustainability and success of any other monetary policy
strategy,
including
a currency board or full dollarization. Indeed, inflation targeting may
help
constrain
fiscal
policy to the extent that the government is actively involved in
setting the
inflation target
(including
through the coordination of future adjustments to government-controlled
prices).
Finally,
a high degree of (partial) dollarization may create a potentially
serious
problem
for
inflation targeting. In fact, in many emerging market countries the
balance
sheets of firms,
households
and banks are substantially dollarized, on both sides, and the bulk of
long-term
debt is
denominated in dollars (Guillermo Calvo, 1999). Because inflation
targeting
necessarily
requires
nominal exchange rate flexibility, exchange rate fluctuations are
unavoidable.
However,
large and abrupt depreciations may increase the burden of
dollar-denominated
debt,
produce a
massive deterioration of balance sheets, and increase the risks of a
financial
crisis
along the
lines discussed in Mishkin (1996). This suggests that emerging market
countries
cannot
afford to ignore the exchange rate when conducting monetary policy
under
inflation
targeting,
but the role they ascribe to is should be clearly subordinated to the
inflation
objective.
It also
suggests that inflation targeting in partially dollarized economies may
not be
viable
unless
there are stringent prudential regulations on, and strict supervision
of,
financial
institutions
that ensure that the system is capable of withstanding exchange rate
shocks.
Lessons from Recent
Experience.7
The earliest
example of an emerging market country adopting inflation targeting is Chile,
which in
1990, with the inflation rate in excess of 20%, first started to
announce an
inflation
objective
in September for the twelve-month inflation rate ending in December of
the
following
year.1 As
pointed out above, for inflation targeting to be a success,
institutions in the
country must
support
independence of the central bank, as well as a strong fiscal position
and sound
financial
system.
Before embarking on inflation targeting, Chile passed new central
bank
legislation in
1
1989
(that took effect in 1990), which gave independence to the central bank
and
mandated price
stability
as one of its primary objectives.2 A sound fiscal policy was also in
place,
with the fiscal
balance
in surplus in every year from 1991 to 1997. In
addition, due largely to the measures
taken
in the
aftermath of its severe banking crisis in the early 1980s, Chile’s
standards and practices in
the areas
of banking regulation and supervision were of a quality comparable to
those
found in
industrialized
countries.
Chile’s central bank was well aware of
the difficulty of controlling inflation and precisely
hitting
the target when inflation was in the double digits, and it dealt with
this
problem in several
ways.
First, like the industrialized countries that have adopted inflation
targeting
(see Bernanke,
et. al,
1999), Chile
phased in inflation targeting gradually after initial successes in
lowering
inflation.
When the inflation objective was first announced in September 1990, it
was
interpreted
more as
official inflation projections rather than as formal or “hard” targets.
Only
after the central
bank
experienced success in both meeting the inflation objectives and
lowering
inflation, did it
begin to
emphasize that the inflation objectives should be interpreted as hard
targets
for which the
central
bank would be accountable (Felipe Morande and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel,
1997).
Second,
Chile’s central bank pursued a very
gradualist approach to lowering its inflation objectives,.8
starting
with targets of over 20% for 1991 and lowering them slowly to 3.5% by
the end
of the
decade.
Third, because of the difficulty of controlling inflation at inflation
rates
which were still
above
10%, a realistic range for the inflation outcomes would have been very
large.
Thus, as part
of the
process of hardening the inflation targets, the Chile’s
central bank switched from
target
ranges to
point targets with its announcement in September 1994 for the 1995
objective.
The
Chilean experience with inflation targeting looks quite successful.
Inflation
fell from
levels above 20%, when inflation projections were first introduced, to
a level
around
3% at
present. Over the same period, output growth was very high, averaging
more than
8%
per year
from 1991 to 1997, a
level comparable to those exhibited by the (former) Asian tigers.
Only in
the last two years has the economy entered a recession with output
growth
falling to
3.4% in
1998 and to a -2.9% rate for the first half of 1999. In 1998 the
Chilean
central bank
was
reluctant to ease monetary policy and let the exchange rate depreciate
in order
to cushion
the
effects of a large, negative terms of trade shock. Instead, the Chilean
central
bank raised
interest
rates and even narrowed the exchange rate band. In hindsight, these
decisions
appear
to have
been a mistake: the inflation target was undershot and the economy
entered a
recession
for the
first time in more than 15 years. Not surprisingly, the central bank
came under
increased
criticism
and in 1999 reversed course, by lowering interest rates and allowing
the peso
to
depreciate.
The
Chilean example suggests that inflation targeting can be used as a
successful
strategy
for gradual disinflation in emerging market countries, even when
initial
inflation is on
the order
of 20%. It is important to emphasize that the success of inflation
targeting
cannot be
solely
attributed to the actions of the Chilean central bank: supportive
policies such
as absence
of large
fiscal deficits and rigorous regulation and supervision of the
financial sector
have been.9
crucial
to its success.3 Another important element of Chile’s
strategy has been a gradual
hardening
of the targets over time. However, the experience in Chile
of the last two years, as
well as
that of industrialized countries, indicates that a key requirement for
successful
inflation-targeting
regimes in emerging market economies is the recognition that
undershooting
inflation
targets is just as costly as overshooting the targets. Support for an
independent
central
bank
which is pursuing price stability can erode if the central bank is
perceived as
focusing
solely
on lowering
inflation to the detriment of other objectives such as minimizing output
variability.
In
addition, Chile
has not yet fully accomplished a full-fledged, inflation targeting
regime. The
Chilean central bank has not yet produced an Inflation Report- type
of
document,
nor does it
publish inflation forecasts; the accountability mechanisms of monetary
policy
are
also weak. Brazil,
on the
other hand, which adopted inflation targeting in the wake of its
currency
crisis in early 1999, shows that a full-fledged inflation targeting
regime can
be put
in place
remarkably quickly. Within four months of the announcement by the newly
appointed
central
bank president that inflation targeting would be adopted, the central
bank of Brazil
implemented
an inflation targeting regime with all the “bells and whistles” found
in
inflation targeters in industrialized countries, including an Inflation
Report with published inflation forecasts. Despite the initial
success of
Brazilian inflation targeting which has kept inflation below 10%
despite a
substantial exchange-rate depreciation, there are still serious doubts
about
whether
it will be ultimately successful because it is by no means clear
whether Brazil
can
solve its deep-rooted fiscal problems.
As noted,
a critical issue for inflation targeting in emerging market countries
is the
role.10 of the exchange rate. Emerging market countries, including
those engaging
in inflation targeting, have rightfully been reluctant to adopt an
attitude of
“benign neglect” of exchange rate movements partly because of the
existence of
a sizable stock of foreign currency and/or a high degree of (partial)
dollarization. Nonetheless, emerging market countries probably have
gone too
far for too long in the direction of limiting exchange rate
flexibility--not
only through the explicit use of exchange rate bands, but also through
frequent
intervention in the foreign
exchange
market. Responding too heavily and too frequently to movements in a
“flexible”
exchange
rate runs the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal
anchor for
monetary
policy that takes precedence over the inflation target, at least in the
eyes of
the public.
One
possible way to avoid this problem is for inflation-targeting central
banks in
emerging
market
countries to adopt a transparent policy of smoothing short-run
exchange-rate
fluctuations
that helps mitigate potentially destabilizing effects of abrupt
exchange rate
changes
while
making it clear to the public that they will allow exchange rates to
reach
their market-determined
level over
longer horizons..11
References
Bernanke,
Ben S.; Laubach, Thomas; Mishkin, Frederic S. and Posen, Adam S. Inflation
Targeting:
Lessons from the International Experience. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University
Press,
1999.
Calvo,
Guillermo. “Capital Markets and the Exchange Rate,” mimeo, University of
Maryland, October, 1999.
Edwards,
Sebastian. “How Effective are Capital Controls? ” Journal of
Economic
Perspectives,
Fall
1999, Volume 13, #4, pp. 65-84.
Masson,
Paul R., Savastano, Miguel A. and Sharma, Sunil. “The Scope for
Inflation
Targeting in
Developing
Countries,” IMF Working Paper 97/130, October, 1997.
Mishkin,
Frederic S. "Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country
Perspective,"
in
Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic, eds., Annual World Bank
Conference on
Development
Economics 1996. Washington D.C.:
World Bank, 1996, pp. 29-62.
Mishkin,
Frederic S. “International Experiences with Different Monetary Regimes,”
Journal
of Monetary Economics, 43, 1999, pp. 579-606.
Mishkin,
Frederic S. and Savastano, Miguel, A. “Monetary Policy Strategies for Latin America,”
mimeo.,
November, 1999.
Mishkin,
Frederic S. and Posen, Adam S. “Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Four
Countries,”
Federal
Reserve Bank of New York
Economic Policy Review, August 1997: 9-110.
Morande, Felipe
and Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus. “Inflation
Targets and Indexation in Chile,”
mimeo,
Central Bank of Chile,
August, 1997..12
1. See
Mishkin and Savastano (1999) for a more
detailed discussion of the experience with
inflation
targeting in Latin America.
2. The
legislation also stipulated a central bank
objective to ensure equilibria in domestic and
external
payments. Partly because of this, Chile maintained an
exchange rate
band around a
crawling peg
during most of the 1990s. Importantly, however, the central bank made
it clear
that
when there
was a potential conflict between the exchange rate band and the
inflation
target, the
inflation
target would take precedence.
3. The
Chilean controls on short-term capital
flows have often been cited as another
important
factor behind the relative stability of the Chilean economy and the
success of
monetary
policy, but rigorous prudential supervision was probably more
important. For a
recent
overview of the debate surrounding Chile’s capital controls,
see
Sebastian Edwards,
1999.
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